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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
SOUTH SANPETE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
DON K. BARTON, et al., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Civil No. 15946 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a condemnation action brought by the Plaintiff-
Respondent to obtain 24.49 acres of real property within the 
City of Manti and owned by Defendant-Appellant. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
Following a jury trial in June 1978, the Defendant-
Appellant was only awarded $1,633.00 per acre for the 24.49 acres 
of land condemned and given to the Plaintiff-Respondent. 
RELIEF ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the jury award of value and 
a new trial due to prejudicial irregularities and errors by 
the Court during the trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant will refer to the Court Record and the trial 
transcript as "R," and "Tr" respectively. 
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Plaintiff-Respondent is the Board of Education of the South 
Sanpete School District (R. at 55) (hereinafter sometimes referred 
to as the "Board" or "Respondent"). Defendant-Appellant (herein-
after sometimes referred to as "Barton" or "Appellant") is a 
resident of Manti in Sanpete County, State of Utah (Tr. at 172), 
and was, prior to this condemnation action, the fee owner of 24.49 
acres located within Manti City in Sanpete County. (R. at 56) 
On or about October 11, 1977, the Board by resolution 
authorized the acquisition of Barton's 24.49 acres for the 
construction of a high school in Manti City and negotiated with 
the Appellant for its purchase. (R. at 2, 55) When the parties 
failed to agree on a price for the land in question, Respondent 
filed this action on October 25, 1977, to condemn the property. 
(R. at 1) 
On January 23, 1978, the lower court granted Respondent's 
Motion for Immedia-::e Dcc:upanc:y and Respondent filed a check with 
the Court Clerk in the amount of $36,735.00 representing 75% of 
Respondent's appraised value of $48,980.00 for the property. (R. 
at 16-17) 
At the conclusion of the trial which lasted three days, the 
jury found the value of the condemned property to be only 
$40,000.00 (R. at 65), despite Respondent's claim in its Motion 
for Immediate Occupancy that the property was worth nearly 
$50,000.00. Judgment awarding that sum to the Appellant was 
entered June 12, 1978, and a final order of condemnation was 
entered on July 10, 1978. (R. at 77-79 and 82-83) Thereafter, 
this appeal was taken. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY VERDICT SHOULD BE REVERSED DUE TO PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN THE LOWER COURT. 
A. The trial court erred in permitting Respondent to 
introduce testimony surrounding the sale of land to the L.D.S. 
Church after determining that such transaction was not relevant. 
Appellant Barton called as an expert witness Mr. Marcellus 
Palmer, a licensed real estate appraiser. (Tr. at 36) Mr. 
Palmer testified that in his expert opinion this Barton property 
in Manti City was worth $6,600.00 per acre. Including the 
agricultural building improvements, the property has a fair 
market value of $166,084.00. (Tr. at 102, 109) Mr. Palmer's 
opinion was based on six comparable transactions within the Manti 
City area. 
In addition to these comparables and also as a basis for 
his expert opinion, Mr. Palmer attempted to show the comparability 
of a sale of land from Grant Cox to the local L.D.S. Church. (Tr. 
at 100-101) Mr. Palmer testified that the Church paid $10,000.00 
for one acre of land located near the Defendant's property. (Tr. 
at 100) Upon the objection of Respondent, the Court precluded 
the witness or counsel from presenting testimony as to the 
comparability of this sale. (Tr. at 100-102) Yet the Court 
permitted cross examination of Mr. Palmer by Respondent's counsel 
regarding this sale. When Appellant thereafter attempted to 
cross examine the Board's appraiser regarding this transaction, 
Appellant was precluded by the Court: 
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THE COURT: Now, I've heard enough of that. Now, let's go 
onto something else. I think I've heard enough about this, 
so let's go onto something else now. The record should 
indicate that this sale is not.relevant in these proceedings, 
so let's go onto another questlon. (Tr. at 270) 
The following day when Court and counsel met in chambers, 
the Board requested permission to call a Mr. Wilbur Cox who was 
the L.D.S. stake president and had dealt with Grant Cox, the 
seller, regarding the Church transaction. (Tr. at 282) Appellant 
objected since Mr. Cox was not listed by counsel as a witness on 
the witness lists exchanged five days prior to trial. Other 
witnesses that Appellant had tried to call had been excluded for 
that reason. (See Tr. 152.) Also, Plaintiff's only "rebuttal 
witness," Mr. Grant Cox, the seller of the land to the Church, 
was in Salt Lake City and not available to testify on that day. 
(Tr. at 282-283) 
a continuance in 
In the alternative, Plaintiff's counsel requestecl' 
order that the testimony of Grant Cox might also 
be made available to the jury. (Tr. at 283) 
The Court noted Plaintiff's objections but denied them both. 
Completely contrary to his previous ruling that the sale was "not 
relevant," the Court allowed Wilbur Cox to testify and stated: 
THE COURT: Your objection's noted and the motion to reopen 
the record for this purpose is allowed. The record should 
further indicate that the Court has had personal knowledge 
of this sale and is of the opinion that it would not be 
proper to leave the jury with this set of facts at this ti~ ! 
and that to refuse to allow a clearing up of the record as 
to that comparable sale would be reversible error and the 
Court is of the opinion that it would be proper and fair to 
allow the evidence and it would be improper not to allow it. 1 
(Tr. at 283) 
Thus, after determininq that such transaction was not 
relevant, the trial court, over objection by Plaintiff's counsel. 
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allowed the testimony of Wilbur Cox. (Tr. at 282-285) 
After emphasizing his prominent community and religious 
position as the local stake president, Mr. Wilbur Cox was 
permitted to give hearsay testimony that the seller, Grant Cox, 
had certain religious and tax motives for selling the property to 
the L.D.S. stake, without even requiring that Mr. Grant Cox testify 
as to his motives. (Tr. at 286-297) 
Plaintiff submits that the effect of the above chain of 
events at trial had a prejudicial impact on the jury. The Court, 
during Appellant's presentation of witnesses, ruled in front of 
the jury that the sale to the "Church" was "not relevant in these 
proceedings" and cut off Appellant's right to go into the matter 
further. (Tr. at 270) Later, because of his "personal knowledge" 
of the sale, the Court permitted Respondent to present the 
authoritative testimony of the local ecclesiastical leader, a 
"surprise" witness, who testified as to the intent and motives 
of another without allowing Appellant the opportunity to rebut 
the same. 
The Court's comments, both in the presence of the jury and 
in chambers, illustrate an abuse of discretion which resulted in 
substantial prejudice to the Appellant. Not only was Appellant 
unable to go into the matter fully during his case in chief, but 
was also later prohibited from rebutting the testimony of Mr. 
Wilbur Cox when the Court reopened the issue because of its 
"personal knowledge" of the sale. 
The whole chain of events preve~ted Appellant from getting 
out all the facts. It not only unfairly allowed the Respondent 
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to "correct" the record, but resulted in prejudicing the jury 
against Appellant and his claims and "colored" the jury's view 
towards the entire matter. 
B. The trial court erred in refusing to allow testimony of 
Dee Ogden, the Board's appraiser, as to the nature of his employ-
ment. 
The trial court, by limiting the scope of examination, 
precluded Appellant from introducing the expert testimony of Hr. 
Dee Ogden, a real estate appraiser who had made an appraisal of 
the property for the School Board. (Tr. at 278) 
In its case in chief, the Board presented the testimony of 
two appraisers. (Tr. at 188, 248) Mr. Gregory E. Austin testified] 
that, in his opinion, the subject land was worth only $1,000.00 
per acre or $27,500.00 with improvements; and Mr. Joseph Dan 
Cloward testified that, in his opinion, the land was only worth 
$1,250.00 per acre or $30,612.50. (Tr. at 206, 252-253) 
Appellant thereafter determined to call Mr. Dee Ogden, who 
had made an appraisal of the property for the Board, as a rebuttal 
witness. (Tr. at 278) Mr. Ogden had obviously not been called 
by the Respondent School Board because his opinion as to the value 
of the property was far greater than that of either Mr. Austin or 
Mr. Cloward. (Tr. at 278) Upon the objection by the Board to 
testimony of Mr. Ogden, Appellant made a proffer of proof that 
Mr. Ogden, if called as a witness for Appellant landowner, would 
testify that he had been hired and paid by the Respondent to 
appraise the subject property. (Tr. at 278) The Court sustainecl 
the objection of Respondent to that testimony and ruled that Mr. 
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Ogden could not testify as to the fact that he had been retained 
by the School Board and paid a fee to appraise the property. (Tr. 
at 278) 
Although the Court ruled that Mr. Ogden could give an 
appraisal on the value of the property, the Court's ruling in 
effect stripped the Appellant from the real value of Mr. Ogden's 
testimony which may have partially offset the aura of "impartiality" 
of the Board in dealing with Appellant. It is obvious that Mr. 
Ogden's appraisal was higher than Respondent's other two appraisers 
because he wasn't called by Respondent to testify and because 
Appellant wanted to put him on the stand. Since Appellant's only 
appraiser had valued the property approximately six times higher 
than the two appraisers called by the Respondent, it would only 
have been fair to permit Mr. Ogden, who would have given an "in-
between" appraisal, to testify for whom he had done the appraisal. 
The jurors had a right to consider as evidence the fact that 
the Respondent School Board had hired an appraiser and decided 
not to use him as a witness at the trial because his appraisal 
was more than the Board's other appraisers. Evidence as to the 
nature of employment of an expert witness is probative in weighing 
his testimony, particularly where the "credibility" of the evidence 
appeared to be a major issue at the trial. Failure to allow such 
testimony was reversible error and prohibited this jury from 
considering all relevant facts in the case. 
c. The lower court erred in refusing to allow testimony of 
Morgan Dyreng. 
Another instance during the trial where prejudicial error 
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occurred was the Court's refusal to allow the testimony of Mr. 
Morgan Dyreng. Mr. Dyreng was the owner-seller of an entire city 
block, consisting of five acres, located within Manti City which 
was sold to the Respondent School Board in December of 1977. 
(Tr. at 74) The purchase price paid by the School Board was 
$7,000.00 per acre. (Tr. at 17B) 
When Appellant's appraiser began to testify concerning that 
purchase of the five acres as a "comparable sale" which had been 
considered by him in his appraisal, the School Board objected on 
the basis of the competency of that sale as evidence and requested 
permission to call a witness in support of the contention that 
the sale was not "voluntary." The jury was excused and the 
School Board then called its own Superintendent, Mr. Ronald E. 
Everett, who testified that he had mentioned to the seller (Mr. 
Dyreng) the possibility of a condemnation suit during the 
negotiations. (Tr. at 75) 
In rebuttal to Mr. Everett's testimony, Appellant wanted to 
call Mr. Dyreng himself to testify that the five-acre sale for 
$7,000.00 an acre was not "under threat of condemnation" but was, 
in fact, an arm's length transaction and sold for a fair price. 
(Tr. at 81) Appellant further argued that the School Board had 
not met its burden of showing that the sale was as a result of 
condemnation pressure and thereby not relevant herein. 
83) 
(Tr. at 
Appellant's position was and now is that simply having the 
power to condemn does not mean that every sale to an entity with 
power of eminent domain is "under the threat of condemnation." 
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(Tr. at. 83-84) The School Board urged that it was "the power to 
condemn" (Tr. at 83) which colors the sale and makes it 
involuntary and hence not relevant in the case. (Tr. at 83) 
Prior decisions of this Court establish that Appellant was 
correct. The mere fact that an entity has the power of eminent 
domain does not exclude any sale to such entity as a "comparable 
sale" on the basis that it is a forced sale. For example, in 
Salt Lake City v. Lewis, 30 Utah 2d 462, 519 P.2d 1344 (1974), 
this Court held that evidence of a sale to Utah Power and Light 
Company was permissible as a comparable sale even though the 
utility had the power of eminent domain. The Court observed that 
such a sale does not prohibit the circumstance as being one from 
a willing buyer to a willing seller. 519 P.2d at 1345. 
Nevertheless, the trial judge herein denied Appellant's 
request to call Mr. Dyreng to the stand to explain that the sale 
was not "under threat of condemnation." The Court said: 
THE COURT: I've heard enough. It's the Court's opinion 
that the sale would be in contemplation of condemnation. 
The Court will not allow the testimony regarding the sale. 
MR. BUSHNELL: I have something else I'd like to take up 
outside the jury. 
THE COURT: I'm going to take the next step, while I have 
it in my mind and in view of that, it is the order of the 
Court that no one present in this Court shall make any 
further statements in the presence of the jury or in response 
to this trial concerning this sale. (Tr. at 85) 
Thus, the result of that decision was to preclude Appellant 
from using that sale as a "comparable" or even to show by testimony 
of the owner-seller of the five-acre tract that it was a voluntary 
sale and thus a "comparable sale" for Mr. Palmer to consider. 
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Mr. Palmer was precluded from saying any more on the subject of 
that sale. The jury was prohibited from considering the fact 
that such similar property to Appellant's land had been purchased 
for $7,000.00 an acre. Certainly such evidence concerning a 
tract comprising several acres should have been presented to the 
jury which finally awarded Appellant approximately $1,500.00 per 
acre. 
Although such error was prejudicial in and of itself, the 
prejudice was further compounded later in the trial by two 
separate events. 
First, Respondent's counsel was later permitted to question 
the Appellant himself on cross examination about the sale of the 
five acres to the School District. (Tr. at 178-180) For example, 
the Court allowed the Board's attorney to ask the following 
questions: 
Q: Would it surprise you to know that the appraisal for 
that land, for the land itself, was within five hundred 
dollars an acre of the same appraisal for your land? 
A: I've been told that and it really bothered me. 
Q: Would it surprise you? 
A: It would really surprise me. 
Q: Do you know that I have shown that appraisal to one of 
the counsel for this side of the table to demonstrate that 
and I would be happy to show it to you? The point simply 
is that for the land itself it was appraised at or near 
the same figure as your land was appraised; isn't that true? 
A: I don't know because I haven't seen it. (Tr. at 179) 
Thus, in effect, the Court allowed the Respondent to get 
into evidence the fact that its appraisal of the five-acre sale 
was close to its appraisal of the Appellant's property. This 
10 
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was done despite the Court's earlier ruling and despite the fact 
that Appellant had been prohibited from putting in testimony as 
to the sales price of that land at $7,000.00 per acre. 
After the Court allowed Respondent to "reopen up" the issue, 
Appellant's attorney was later censured in front of the jury for 
trying to go into the same subject with Mr. Austin, one of the 
School District's appraisers. (Tr. at 210-211) 
The second resulting prejudice was the position in which Mr. 
Palmer (Appellant's only expert witness) was left in the eyes of 
the jury. Without being able to testify as to the five-acre 
"comparable sale," he was left mainly with small acre-or-less 
comparables. The substantial prejudice occurred when the School 
District's appraiser belittled Mr. Palmer for relying on sales 
of very small tracts as comparables. For example, Mr. Austin 
testified in response to Appellant's question of comparability 
of two other sales with smaller sizes: 
A. Well, that's just about everything, Brother. That's 
everything. There ain't no comparable. How can you compare 
one acre with twenty five acres? There's no way. No way 
in this world. I would get kicked out of the Institute for 
doing a thing like that, absolutely lose my designation. 
(Tr. at 231-232) 
Such prejudicial comments resulted from the Court's ruling 
that Mr. Palmer's larger "comparable sale" was not to be considered 
and obviously created the impression with the jury that sales 
involving only small tracts of land had been used as comparables 
by Mr. Palmer. 
Thus, the improper ruling of the trial court served to 
compound the prejudicial effects of the error of the trial court 
ll 
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in refusing to allow Mr. Dyreng to testify concerning his $7,000.0G' 
per acre sale to the School District: 
1. The jury was precluded from considering it as a comparab~ 
sale; 
2. The School Board was later permitted indirectly to get 
in evidence before the jury of a purported appraisal of property 
for a substantially lesser amount than what the property was 
actually sold for; and 
3. Appellant's appraiser was put in a bad light as it looked 
as if he relied mainly, if not exclusively, on sales involving 
smaller tracts as his only comparable sales. 
The jury could not help but be substantially influenced by 
such error, as the ~inal verdict herein illustrates. 
POINT II 
CUMULATIVE EfFEC: OF THE ERRONEOUS RULINGS IN THE LOWER 
COURT. 
A trial court has considerable latitude in a condemnation 
case in deciding whether to admit certain evidence and testimony. 
State of Utah By and Through its Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Utah 
2d 317, 452 P.2d 872, 874 (1969). However, despite the amount 
of discretion given to the trial judge to control the trial, that 
discretion is not limitless. 
Although harmless and minor errors are bound to occur in 
some trials, when an error occurs which provides "at least some 
likelihood of a different result in its absence," the Supreme 
Court is justified in reversing the verdict. Harris v. Harris, 
14 Utah 2d 96, 377 P.2d 1007, 1009 n.2 (1963). See, also, Salt 
12 
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Lake County v. Kazura, 22 Utah 2d 313, 452 P.2d 869, 871 (1969); 
wardell v. Jerman, 18 Utah 2d 359, 423 P.2d 485, 487 (1967); 
Paull v. Zions First National Bank, 18 Utah 2d 183, 417 P.2d 759, 
961, n.S (1966); Eager v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P.2d 1003, 
1005 (1966); and Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822 
(1961). 
Furthermore, when a case is tried to a jury, the rulings on 
evidence need to be scrutinized on appeal more critically than 
in a trial to the judge only. Arnovitz v. Tella, 27 Utah 2d 261, 
495 P.2d 310, 311-12 (1972); In Re Baxter's Estate, 16 Utah 2d 
284, 288, 399 P.2d 442 (1965). 
Appellant submits that rulings of Court during the trial, as 
discussed herein, were so substantial and prejudicial that Appellant 
was deprived of the opportunity of "a full and fair consideration" 
of the disputed issue and fair consideration of the disputed 
issues. See Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 
526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah 1974). See, also, Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City v. Mitsui Investment, Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1374 
(Utah 1974). 
The Supreme Court, in giving a trial judge latitude in 
deciding what evidence to exclude, has used the standard of 
"reasonable comparability" in the area of condemnation cases. 
State By and Through Its Road Commission v. Wood, supra, at 874. 
In Wood, the court observed that all parcels of property are not 
alike and cannot be identical. Thus, if another sale of land 
can be said to have any "probative value" on the price of the 
subject property, it should be admitted. The fact that there 
13 
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are some differences between the comparable sale and the subject 
sale goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its competency. 
452 P.2d at 874. Yet the trial court precluded Appellant on more 
than one instance of presenting testimony of the comparability 
of different sales of land. 
The policy in condemnation cases is to permit all relevant 
evidence to establish the true fair market value of the condemnee's 
land. See Weber County Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 
Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959). Therein the court indicated 
that adequate opportunity should be given the landowner to make 
certain he receives the fair market value of his land inasmuch 
as he is being forced by the State's police power to forfeit his 
property. This Court stated that it was error for the lower court 
to refuse to allow Lhe landowner to testify as to the price he 
paid for the la~c E : ~ years earlier. The Court held that any 
probative information should be admitted. Differences in 
comparability, if any, go to the weight of the evidence rather 
than its admissibility: 
"Such sales, [of the same property] when made under normal 
and fair conditions, are necessarily a better test of the 
market value than speculative opinions of witnesses; for 
truly, here is where money talks." 347 P.2d at 864. 
Although we are not concerned here with the admissibility of the 
original purchase price of the subject property, the analogous 
policy argument remains--evidence of prior sales should be allowed 
with appropriate explanations to the jury inasmuch as they are 
"a better test of the market value than speculative opinions of 
witnesses." While Appellant was prevented from giving a full 
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and fair presentation of his evidence as to certain sales, 
Respondent was permitted at length to dispute the applicability 
of such sales. 
Weber County v. Ward, supra, also discussed the importance 
of cross examination of witnesses. Therein, the condemnee was 
effectively denied the opportunity to cross examine an adverse 
witness because of the witness' noncommital, irresponsive answers. 
The court observed: 
"The purpose of cross-examination is to give adversary 
counsel the opportunity not only to inquire into uncertainties 
relating to the testimony in chief, but to test its credibility. 
Whatever may tend to explain, modify, or contradict the direct 
evidence should be allowed. Even though it is generally said 
that the trial judge has discretion to control cross-examination 
within reasonable limitations, he should not so restrict it 
as to prevent inquiry into matters having a direc~ bearing 
upon vital issues as was done here." 347 P.2d at 865. 
In the instant case, failure to allow lrr. Dyreng and Mr. Grant 
Cox to testify in effect reduced the credibility of Appellant's 
other witnesses and testimony. Yet Respondent was allowed to 
produce his own testimony regarding these sales and Appellant was 
restricted in his cross examination. Yet another illustration 
of this occurred when Appellant sought to call a witness during 
his case. Appellant called Mr. Richard McFarlane to testify. 
(Tr. at 152) The School Board objected because Mr. McFarlane was 
not listed on the pretrial witness list exchanged by counsel. 
Despite Appellant's arguments that he had just learned of Mr. 
McFarlane and that neither he nor his testimony would be a 
"surprise" to the Board (Tr. at 152), the Court refused to let 
him testify (Tr. at 153), which again prohibited the Appellant 
from putting all the relevant facts before the jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant urges this Court to reverse the verdict and grant 
Appellant a new trial. Reversible and prejudicial error occurred 
on several occasions during the trial, coloring the jury's findings, I 
prohibiting them from considering relevant and probative evidence 
and alienating them from the Appellant in the case. The cumulative, 
effect of the errors resulted in substantial prejudice to the 
outcome of the case and in an unfortunate miscarriage of justice. 
Such prejudice should not be lightly rejected and passed over as 
harmless error as the verdict indicates that the jury was affected 
by the errors. 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to grant a new 
trial. 
a-<1-
Respectfully submitted this 1 day of March, 1979. 
~· 
Clark R. Nielsen 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK I 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1 410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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